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The European Union has set ambitious targets for emission reduction and the
penetration of renewable energy, including the electricity generation sector as one of
the major emitters of CO2. After a period of subsidy-driven investments, the costs of
renewables decreased strongly making investments more attractive. Since European
countries differ strongly in terms of natural resources, we analyse the profitability
of wind onshore and offshore and solar PV across Europe to determine where it is
optimal to invest in the future and to understand which factors drive the profitability
of the investments. We use a power systems model to simulate the whole European
electricity market in 2030. Using the renewable revenues determined by the model,
we calculate the internal rate of return to analyse how profitable each technology
is in each country. We find that investments in the considered technologies are not
homogeneously profitable across Europe. This suggests that cooperation between
European countries can be expected to achieve the overall targets at lower costs than
nationally-driven approaches. We also find that in many countries, wind onshore and
solar PV are profitable by 2030 in absence of any financial support. Wind offshore
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1 Introduction
The European Commission (EC) and the European Council set ambitious energy targets
for 2030 in order to secure clean and efficient energy in the European Union.1 In 2014,
EU countries agreed that by 2030, the share of renewables should be 27% of total en-
ergy consumption in order to achieve the overall target of 40% GHG emission reduction
(Commission, 2014a). In 2018, this overall renewable target has been increased to 32%
of total energy consumption (Commission, 2018). This target holds at the EU level, so
all countries should work together either by reducing the energy demand or increasing
generation from renewable energy sources (RES), to achieve the overall goals.
Electricity generation is one of the sectors affected by the EU targets together with
transport, agriculture and industry, as it is one of the major sectors responsible for total
emissions (EUROSTAT, 2017). Following the track started with the 2020 targets on
emission reductions, renewable electricity generation (RES-E) should increase to 49% of
total electricity demand by 2030 in order to be consistent with the overall target on total
energy demand, as noted by the Commission (2014a) in its own impact assessment analysis.
The installed capacity in renewable energy has increased strongly during the last
decade, when every EU country set up different incentives to promote the investment
in renewable generation. There are several works that focus on the costs and the regu-
latory changes needed to promote the investments in renewable energy. All these works
highlight that subsidies given to renewables are positively related with the investment in
this type of generation in all EU countries. Papaefthymiou and Dragoon (2016) and Held
et al. (2018) analyse the impact of increasing RES-E penetration in the EU system and
focus on the associated distribution network costs. Other studies (Edenhofer et al., 2013;
Cambini and Rondi, 2010; Boomsma et al., 2012; Sisodia and Soares, 2015; Winkler et al.,
2016) analyse how regulation and subsidies are necessary to encourage the investment in
renewable energy.
Despite the positive correlation between subsidies and investment in RES-E, it is widely
recognised that the use of subsidies is suboptimal with respect to the first best solution of
carbon-pricing (Kalkuhl et al., 2013), so a rigorous analysis is needed to assess under which
conditions investments in renewable energy are economically profitable without subsidies.
Looking at 2030, investment costs associated with renewables should decrease over
time, making the investment in renewable energy more attractive to market operators
1See EC Directive 2009/28, Commission (2014b) and EU Council (2014).
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(IRENA, 2012). However, European countries are quite different in terms of natural
resources and the availability of wind and solar irradiation, thus a careful analysis of the
profitability of investments in renewable technologies is required to determine where it is
optimal to invest in the future, as capital costs of renewables are often higher than for
fossil fuels (Neuhoff et al., 2016).
Despite the importance of the subject, there are not many studies focusing on the
profitability of renewable technologies in 2030 or beyond, in particular when it comes to
comparing countries across Europe. Duscha et al. (2016) combined short and long term
simulations to find the optimal technological and economical pattern to meet the emission
targets up to 2050. The authors examine the impact of different RES targets on the
EU economy and find that the Commission’s overall renewable energy target should be a
minimum target rather than the maximum level of RES. The authors show that a RES
penetration going beyond the overall EU target results in higher economic benefits for the
Union. As the investment costs of RES decrease over time, the authors highlight that
new investments rely on convenient cost of capital, and the regulation should then focus
on reducing that in the next years. Finally, the authors point out that offshore wind and
tidal energy are not economically efficient, so subsidies would need to be provided in order
to incentivise investments in these technologies. Safarzyńska and van den Bergh (2017)
focus on the financial stability associated with the investment in renewables and find that
investments in gas fired plants instead of renewable technologies would be beneficial in
countries in which coal plants are still active and play a major role in generation. Finally
Knopf et al. (2015) find that the cost-effective share of RES-E to meet the European
targets in 2030 ranges from 43% to 56%, raising the question about the profitability of
new investments above the threshold of 49% identified by the Commission. However, no
specific focus is given to the profitability of specific technologies.
In this work we therefore investigate whether the investment in specific renewable tech-
nologies (solar, wind onshore and wind offshore) is profitable across Europe. In particular,
we compare several scenarios to determine under which conditions investment in renew-
ables would be profitable in each country without additional financial support. A review
of methods adopted to optimally locate investments in renewables is provided by Tan
et al. (2013). We use a power systems model to simulate the whole European electricity
market in 2030 aimed at investigating the costs and benefits of investment in renewable
technologies for all EU countries. We then use the output of the power systems model
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to calculate the internal rate of return for solar, wind onshore and wind offshore invest-
ments in each country in Europe. We focus on these technologies in this paper because
significant investments in additional hydro capacity are rather unlikely and limitations to
the feedstock potential are found to limit the expansion of biomass for electricity only
generation (Hennig et al., 2016).
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the methodol-
ogy and data used. Section 3 presents our results, which we discuss in section 4. Section
5 concludes.
2 Methodology and data
2.1 Methodology
We use the Artelys Crystal Super Grid power systems model to simulate the European
electricity market in 2030 (EU28 plus Switzerland and Norway).2 The model minimises
the overall generation costs across the EU to meet demand at an hourly resolution and
subject to generator technical characteristics.
In these simulations a competitive market is assumed across the EU (i.e. no market
power and power plants bid their short run marginal cost) and we assume perfect foresight,
whereby the model has full knowledge of all input variables such as demand and variable
renewable generation output. This hypothesis does not allow us to investigate the poten-
tial beneficial effects of competition in mitigating anti-competitive behaviour in different
markets, as noted by Neuhoff et al. (2005). The resulting market price is calculated as
the marginal price at member state level and does not include any extra revenues from
potential balancing, reserve or capacity markets or costs such as grid infrastructure cost,
capital costs or taxes.
For the economic assessment, we calculate the internal rate of return (IRR) for so-
lar PV, wind onshore and wind offshore at member state level. We deliberately chose
to calculate the IRR rather than the net present value (NPV) or the annuity since the
calculation of the latter always requires an interest rate as input. Consequently, an NPV
or annuity can only be interpreted subject to the assumed interest rate (Bertsch et al.,
2017a). We acknowledge that the use of the NPV or annuity would be more common than
the use of the IRR within a single company with a fixed equity ratio (and hence a quasi
2See: https://www.artelys.com. We thank Artelys for the provision of the software and their support.
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fixed interest rate). However, since equity ratios may differ between investors and interest
rates for borrowed capital may differ between countries, we deemed the IRR to be more
appropriate for comparing the profitability of investments across Europe.
The IRR is the interest rate that leads to an NPV or annuity of €0 including the
cash flows CFt (revenues and expenses, including investments CF0) over all time periods
t ∈ {0, ..., T} of an investment project, where T is the project’s lifetime (see equation (1)).
Artelys calculates annual revenues based on the hourly generation by technology and
country and hourly prices by country assuming marginal costs of zero for the considered
technologies. Capital and fixed operational expenditures are considered ex post and,
together with the revenues calculated by Artelys, provide input to our IRR calculations.
NPV =
T∑
t=0
1
(1 + IRR)tCFt ≡ 0 (1)
.
2.2 Data
The input data for our analysis can be structured into three main categories: a) supply
and demand data for modelling the European power system, b) fuel and carbon prices,
and c) capital and fixed operational expenditures of the considered RES-E technologies.
a) Supply and demand data
The supply and demand input data to Artelys are broadly based on Deane et al.
(2017). This includes data on the generation portfolio and demand for the 28 European
member states from the 2016 European Commission modelling of a Reference Scenario
(PRIMES) of the future European Energy system.3 The Reference Scenario is one vision
of the European power system in 2030 based on business-as-usual assumptions, including
full implementation of European climate and energy policies adopted by December 2014
to achieve a renewable electricity penetration of 49% in 2030 up from 27.5% in 2014.4 5
3PRIMES is a partial equilibrium model that provides projections of detailed energy balances, both
for demand and supply, CO2 emissions, investment in demand and supply, energy technology penetration,
prices and costs”. The projections are set up in order to meet the EU 2016 targets on emissions for
2030:http://ec.europa.eu/environment/archives/air/models/primes.htm.
4The generation mixes of Switzerland and Norway are not included in the PRIMES scenario. Swiss
data was developed based on data available from the Federal Department of the Environment, Transport,
Energy and Communications (DETEC). Norwegian data was developed based on data available from the
Norwegian government (see: https://www.regjeringen.no) for thermal power plants and the Norwegian
water resources and energy directorate (NVE, see: https://www.nve.no) for renewables including hydro
power.
5Note that the portfolio used for PRIMES 2016 does not exactly match the recent EU target to achieve
32% of renewables in final energy consumption by 2030 (see: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_
STATEMENT-18-4155_en.htm). It is consistent, however, with a 49% target for renewable electricity.
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In addition to the data of the PRIMES Reference Scenario, hourly wind power gener-
ation for each Member State was taken from Aparicio et al. (2016). Hourly solar profiles
for each Member State were developed using NREL’s PVWatts® Calculator web applica-
tion, which determines the electricity production of photovoltaic systems based on system
location and basic system design parameters. Moreover, our model includes the network
interconnection capacities between EU countries, as described in ENTSOE (2016) for 2030.
Table 1: Installed RES capacity, MW, by country, 2030
Country Wind Onshore Wind Offshore Solar Hydro Other Renewables
AT 4,545 0 2,821 13,756 815
BE 3,557 3,350 3,818 1,484 820
BG 2,122 0 2,572 2,338 101
CH 834 0 5,272 16,587 0
CY 229 0 529 0 11
CZ 488 0 2,391 1,109 274
DE 57,796 9,418 63,959 13,102 7,065
DK 4,134 2,318 838 10 2,870
EE 445 0 1 8 154
ES 29,824 64 24,564 16,795 1,923
FI 2,763 152 19 3,461 3,330
FR 23,717 7,055 25,382 28,803 4,350
GR 6,038 0 5,616 3,579 232
HR 682 0 686 2,190 29
HU 477 0 106 57 409
IE 4,003 131 19 587 208
IT 15,574 3 24,562 18,939 6,182
LT 467 0 74 116 139
LU 302 0 131 1,345 35
LV 238 48 2 1,589 108
MT 0 0 198 0 2
NI 1,525 500 4 0 133
NL 6,975 3,121 5,586 37 2,308
NO 1,000 0 15 30,495 155
PL 9,442 897 99 1,039 2,105
PT 6,275 28 2,172 9,971 693
RO 6,017 0 2,223 6,645 157
SE 9,013 0 88 16,742 3,161
SI 242 0 779 1,284 118
SK 19 0 680 1,725 332
UK 18,550 12,846 11,040 4,624 17,233
Total 217,292 39,930 186,243 198,416 55,451
The installed RES capacities by country are taken from PRIMES and summarised
in Table 1. In this paper, RES capacities include hydro and thermal RES, where the
latter is the sum of biomass, geothermal and other renewables. Table 1 reveals that the
installed renewable capacity is not distributed homogeneously across Europe. Countries
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in the South, such as Spain and Portugal, have a higher proportion of solar generation
than countries like Belgium or Ireland. Northern countries are rich in wind generation,
and Central European countries have a variable proportion of both resources.
b) Fuel and carbon prices
The fuel prices used in our analysis are taken from DECC (2016) and summarised in
Table 2. The generators’ costs are based on fuel costs, emission costs and heat rates.6
Table 2: Fuel price assumptions, (€2010)
€/GJ Nuclear Coal Gas (CCGT, OCGT, derived gas) Oil Carbon
Low 2.00 2.40 5.70 10.00 20.00
Baseline 2.00 2.90 8.50 14.80 37.00
High 2.00 3.70 12.30 21.50 40.00
Data source: DECC (2016). Exchange rate €/GBP=0.858
c) RES capital and fixed operational expenditures
As in Slednev et al. (2018), capital and fixed operational expenditures are taken from
Taylor et al. (2016). For 2015, their assumptions are 1,810 US$/kW for solar PV, 1,560
US$/kW for wind onshore and 4,650 US$/kW for wind offshore translating into 1,629
€/kW for solar PV, 1,404 €/kW for wind onshore and 4,185 €/kW for wind offshore
assuming an exchange rate of 1 US$= 0.90 €. For 2025, Taylor et al. (2016) assume
technology costs of 790 US$/kW for solar PV, 1,370 US$/kW for wind onshore and 3,950
US$/kW for wind offshore translating into 711 €/kW for solar PV, 1,233 €/kW for wind
onshore and 3,555 €/kW for wind offshore. Given that our study focusses on 2030, we will
use the assumptions for 2025 as baseline technology costs. However, we will also carry
out the analysis using the values for 2015 to show what happens if technology costs do
not decrease as anticipated. Moreover, these assumptions will be varied in a number of
additional sensitivity analyses the results of which are presented in section 3.4. In terms
of fixed operating and maintenance costs, we assume 1% of the specific investment costs
per year for solar PV and 2% for wind onshore and wind offshore. The lifetime of the
investment is assumed to be 20 years for all considered technologies. Again, we will vary
this assumption (see section 3.5) to explore the impact of longer/shorter lifetimes.
6Production costs for power plant type i, inclusive of CO2, are calculated as:
ProdCosti = FuelPricei ∗HeatRatei + ETS ∗ (HeatRatei ∗ CO2EmissRatei) (2)
The assumed CO2 emission rates are 93.6 kg/GJ for coal, 55.9 kg/GJ for gas and 77 kg/GJ for oil.
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3 Results
We now present the results of our analysis. Section 3.1 provides an overview of the achieved
RES-E shares by country and technology in 2030, whereas section 3.2 provides insights
into the different technologies’ profitability in each country. Subsequently, sections 3.3-3.5
illustrate the impact on the IRR when varying the assumptions in relation to fuel prices,
technology costs and lifetime respectively.
3.1 RES-E shares
First, we calculate the renewable penetration using the model results. With our assump-
tions including the demand and generation portfolio from PRIMES, the share of renewable
electricity generation (hydro, solar, wind, biomass and other renewables) is 49% of the total
European electricity demand. This is in line with the recommendation by EU Commission
Staff (2014) to meet the EU 2030 target in relation to total energy demand.
Figure 1: Proportion of RES generation on total demand, 2030
Figure 1 examines the proportion between RES-E generation and demand for each EU
country (plus Switzerland and Norway). Figure 1 shows that Switzerland and countries in
Scandinavia, e.g., Denmark and Norway, have the highest RES-E over demand proportion.
These countries are followed by Austria (driven by their hydro power capacities, similar
to Norway and Switzerland), the UK and a couple of Southern-European countries such
as Portugal (79%), Greece (66%) and Spain (57%). Note that RES curtailment in our
model is very low. In part, this can be explained by the fact that we do not consider the
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transmission network within each country. In addition, we assume that interconnection
capacities between the countries have been realised accordingly to the 10 year network
development plan (TYNDP) from ENTSOE. As a result, renewable generation may flow
between the EU countries, reducing curtailment. Overall, the RES-E shares from our
model should therefore be considered as upper limits. Eastern European countries have the
lowest renewable share as a proportion of total demand. In countries such as Hungary, the
Czech Republic, Poland and Lithuania less than 20% of final demand is met by renewable
generation. Italy, Ireland and Germany have RES-E shares of almost 50%, whereas France
has a relatively lower RES share of around 40%. On the other hand, however, France has
a high share of nuclear generation, which is low-carbon, too.
Figure 1 also shows that countries with a very high overall RES-E share but without
significant hydro capacities (e.g., Denmark and the UK) have rather high shares of other
(thermal) RES-E. Moreover, it shows that with very few exceptions, the wind onshore
shares are higher than the solar power shares. Overall, Figure 1 reveals that the expected
RES shares in 2030 differ significantly across Europe. Because of differing RES-E capacity
factors (mainly influenced by the geographical and meteorological conditions) and whole-
sale electricity market price levels and structures, we also expect the profitability of RES
investments to differ strongly between countries. In the following subsections, we therefore
analyse the profitability of RES according to the PRIMES model based on their economic
performance in 2030 for each member state aimed at understanding which countries have
favourable conditions for which technologies. Since significant investments in additional
hydro capacity are rather unlikely and limitations to the feedstock potential may limit
the expansion of biomass for electricity only generation (Hennig et al., 2016), we focus on
investments in solar PV as well as wind onshore and wind offshore in our analysis.
3.2 Profitability of investment in RES-E
Figure 2a provides an overview of the profitability of the three considered RES-E technolo-
gies across Europe on the basis of the IRR. The IRR of the investments increases from the
left to the right. For the baseline fuel price and technology cost assumptions, investment
in wind onshore is more profitable than in solar PV for half of the countries, while solar PV
is more profitable for the other half. Wind offshore is not profitable, neither considering
high nor low capital costs.
Broadly speaking, four categories of countries can be identified. First, there are a
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number of countries (e.g., in Scandinavia and other parts of Northern or Western Europe)
where wind onshore is rather profitable, whereas the profitability of solar PV is low. Sec-
ond, there is a group of countries in the South-Eastern part of Central Europe where solar
PV is rather profitable, whereas wind onshore investments reach their lowest IRRs (e.g.,
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria). Third, there are some countries in
Central Europe where the profitability of both solar PV and wind onshore is rather low
(e.g., Luxembourg, Lithuania and Slovenia). Fourth, there are a few countries in Southern
Europe with coastal access where the profitability of both technologies is rather high (e.g.,
Portugal, Greece and Cyprus).
Looking at the investment in solar power, Italy, with a large capacity of solar PV in-
stalled, has the highest profitability for this technology, followed by Malta, Greece, Cyprus
and Portugal. Looking at the investment in wind onshore, the Netherlands, Cyprus and
Greece achieve the highest IRRs, followed by a number of Scandinavian countries (Fin-
land, Denmark, Sweden) and the UK. The situation is structurally similar for wind off-
shore investments. This technology achieves the relatively highest IRR in the Netherlands,
followed by Finland, Denmark and the UK. However, for the baseline technology cost as-
sumptions, this relatively highest IRR in the Netherlands is still negative.
As expected, Figure 2b generally shows that the profitability of RES-E investments is
much lower if today’s (2015) technology costs do not decrease as anticipated by Taylor
et al. (2016). In this case, wind onshore investments are more profitable than solar PV
investments for all considered countries. In other words, while the IRR of wind onshore
investments only decreases by around 2%, there is a step change in terms of the profitability
of solar PV investments. This is mainly driven by the much stronger cost reduction
assumptions until 2025 in the case of solar PV as compared to wind onshore.
Overall, Figure 2 shows that investments in PV are particularly profitable in Southern
European countries. Moreover, Figure 2 demonstrates the importance of reducing PV
technology costs from today’s levels in order to make this technology viable widely across
Europe. Investments in wind onshore seem generally profitable in Northern European
countries but also in some countries on the Mediterranean or Atlantic coast, the latter
having favourable conditions for both solar PV and wind onshore. On the contrary, a
number of countries in Central and Eastern Europe would neither have favourable condi-
tions for PV nor wind. It might therefore be better for these countries to import renewable
energy (certificates) from other EU countries with more favourable conditions assuming
10
that the overall objective is to increase renewable penetration at the lowest-possible costs.
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Figure 2: Overview of IRR across countries and technologies for today’s and future tech-
nology cost assumptions
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3.3 Impact of fuel price variations on the profitability of RES-E invest-
ments
Figures 3 and 4 show how the IRRs of the different RES-E investments change when fuel
prices (and hence electricity prices) are higher or lower than the baseline assumptions
(see Table 2 for the corresponding assumptions in the High and Low scenarios), while the
technology costs are not changed. As expected, higher fuel prices increase the profitability
of solar PV (see Figure 3a). Italy and Malta still achieve the highest IRRs for solar
investments, now exceeding 18%. However, a number of countries in which the IRR was
below 5% for the baseline assumptions now achieve an IRR of 8-9% (e.g., Scandinavia,
the UK or Ireland). On average, the IRR increases by around 4% in the High fuel price
scenario compared to the baseline fuel price scenario. In contrast, lower fuel prices result in
IRRs around or below zero for solar investments for some countries (e.g., France, the UK,
Ireland and Scandinavia). On average, the IRRs are around 5.5% lower in this scenario
than for the baseline assumptions.
Figure 3b shows similar effects for wind onshore. On average, the IRRs are around
4.5% higher in the High fuel price scenario compared to the baseline scenario. Lower fuel
prices result in IRRs that are around 6.1% lower on average than in the baseline scenario
for this technology. This means that the IRRs for wind onshore investments are negative
for some countries, including Slovenia, Luxembourg, Lithuania, Bulgaria and the Czech
Republic, while Hungary and Romania yield IRRs of around zero under these fuel prices.
Figure 4 shows how wind offshore investments are affected by the different fuel price
scenarios. In the scenario with high fuel prices, the IRRs are around 3.5% higher on
average than under the baseline assumptions. While in the baseline scenario the IRRs
for wind offshore were negative across Europe, the IRR is slighty positive under high fuel
prices in the Netherlands (around 0.5%), followed by Finland and Denmark. Under low
fuel prices, the IRRs of wind onshore would be strictly negative across Europe (around
6.4% lower on average than for the baseline assumptions), whereby the order between the
countries remains largely unchanged.
Overall it is interesting to note that the fuel price variations do not have the exact
same impact on all countries. For instance, Figure 3b shows that for wind onshore, the
order between the countries would be slightly different under the High scenario than under
the Baseline scenario. This can be explained by different power systems and generation
portfolios, which are affected by the fuel price variations in different ways.
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Figure 3: Impact of fuel price variations on the IRR of solar and wind onshore investments
across Europe, 2030
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Figure 4: Impact of fuel price variations on the IRR of wind offshore investments across
Europe, 2030
3.4 Impact of technology cost variations on the profitability of RES-E
investments
For the considered technologies, the study by Taylor et al. (2016) suggests that there will
be huge reductions of investment-related costs by 2025. However, there is obviously also a
very high uncertainty related to these reductions, which is yet higher in our case given that
our analysis is based on 2030. A thorough sensitivity analysis of the impact of changes
in technology costs on the profitability of RES-E investments is therefore very important.
We shall do this using fuel price assumptions of the baseline scenario.
Figure 5a shows how the IRR of solar PV investments changes across Europe when
the specific investment costs of solar PV vary between 500 e/kW and 1,750 e/kW (where
Taylor et al. (2016) expect 711 e/kW by 2025). It becomes obvious that such cost reduc-
tions lead to a step change in profitability of PV across Europe. Already a slightly less
ambitious reduction to 1,000 e/kW would result in positive IRRs for the vast majority of
countries in Europe and in IRRs around or above 5% for a third of the member states.
Figure 5b shows how specific investment costs of wind onshore varying between 1,000
e/kW and 2,000 e/kW affect the IRR of wind onshore across Europe (where Taylor et al.
(2016) expect 1,233 e/kW by 2025). If technology costs of wind onshore remained un-
changed or increased slightly, the IRRs would still be positive in most countries. However,
if the specific investment costs fell to around 1,000 e/kW, the IRRs would exceed 5%
across Europe, while for two thirds of the countries they would exceed 10%.
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Figure 5: Impact of technology cost variations on the IRR of solar and wind onshore
investments across Europe, 2030
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across Europe, 2030
Figure 6 shows how technology cost variations between 2,000 e/kW and 3,500 e/kW
would affect wind offshore investments. While Taylor et al. (2016) expect 3,555 e/kW
by 2025, Figure 6 shows that reductions to 2,000 e/kW would be necessary to achieve
a positive IRR in most countries with wind offshore potential. However, even for such
significant cost reductions, the IRR would not exceed 5% in any of the countries, which
may not be sufficient to make this a viable investment given the scale of offshore projects.
3.5 Impact of lifetime variations on RES-E investments
We now explore how changes in the expected lifetime of solar and wind projects affect their
profitability, where our baseline assumption is 20 years (see section 2.2). Figure 7 shows
that for both solar PV and wind onshore, decreasing the lifetime expectation to 15 years
would result in IRRs that are around 2% lower on average. An increase in the lifetime of
the projects would have a slightly lower positive effect. The IRRs for both technologies
would be around 1% higher for a lifetime of 25 years (compared to 20 years), while the
IRRs would increase by another 0.5% for a lifetime of 30 years (compared to 25 years).
Furthermore, Figure 7a shows for solar PV investments that a lifetime reduction to 15
years would lead to an IRR of below 4% in almost 50% of the countries. An increased
lifetime of 25 years, however, would ensure an IRR of at least 6% in almost all countries.
For wind onshore, Figure 7b shows that the IRR would fall below 6% if the lifetime was
reduced to 15 years. A lifetime increase to 25 years, would ensure an IRR of at least 8%
for two thirds of the countries. However, countries in Northern Europe (Estonia, Finland,
Sweden and Norway) and Western Europe (Belgium, UK, Netherlands) as well as Cyprus
and Greece achieve IRRs of around or higher than 8% for all considered lifetime scenarios.
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Figure 7: Impact of lifetime variations on the IRR of solar and wind onshore investments
across Europe, 2030
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Figure 8: Impact of lifetime variations on the IRR of wind offshore investments across
Europe, 2030
Figure 8 shows that the IRR of wind offshore investments is yet more sensitive to
lifetime variations than the IRR of wind onshore or PV. A lifetime reduction of offshore
projects to 15 years would come along with IRRs that are around 4.5% lower on average.
A lifetime increase to 25 years would lead to IRRs that are around 2.5% higher on average
(compared to 20 years), while the IRRs would increase by another 1.5% for a lifetime of
30 years (compared to 25 years). However, with the exception of an assumed lifetime of
30 years in the Netherlands the IRRs remain negative under all lifetime scenarios for the
baseline technology cost and fuel price assumptions.
4 Discussion
The results in the previous section highlight that the market-based profitability of RES-E
investments differs substantially across Europe. While some technologies are profitable in
some countries without any additional subsidies, the same or other technologies are not
profitable in other countries. Consequently, if all countries, for whatever reason, sought
to deploy all RES technologies within their own jurisdiction, additional incentives would
need to be provided to investors, which would ultimately be borne by the consumers.
In theory this suggests that, as long as interconnection capacities between countries are
sufficiently high, it would be more efficient to export renewable generation from countries
in which natural conditions incentivise the development of renewable generation to other
countries in which these conditions are less favourable. However, the issue of trading so-
called Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs) or Guarantees of Origin (GOs) is debated
controversially. While those in favour of an approach for cross-border trading of renew-
ables (e.g., Perez et al., 2016) would broadly follow the same arguments outlined above,
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those against such an approach (e.g., Toke, 2008) would typically highlight the adminis-
trative barriers and increasing risk for investors ultimately turning into increased costs to
consumers. In contrast, Green et al. (2016) propose a market design aimed at facilitating
long-distance trading of renewable energy, hence mitigating existing barriers. Altogether,
it should be noted that our analysis across the EU focusses on 2030 and shows that the
considered RES technologies are profitable in quite a few countries without any subsidies,
largely driven by cost reductions of RES technologies. This suggests that spikes of REC
prices as anticipated by Haas et al. (2011) for trading-based RES support systems within
individual countries should not be expected, at least not to the same extent.
In this paper, we present IRRs for different RES-E technologies across Europe. For
an adequate interpretation, it is important to note that these have been calculated using
wholesale electricity prices and a uniform payback period of 20 years. We acknowledge,
however, that in reality there are different investors with different expectations and con-
siderations. Energy companies or investment funds are likely investors in wind onshore
capacities (García-Álvarez et al., 2017), which suggests that the use of wholesale electric-
ity prices is adequate. In the case of solar PV, on the other hand, and indeed some wind
onshore projects, likely investors also include non-energy companies (Bergek et al., 2013),
whose investment considerations would be based on industrial tariffs rather than wholesale
prices. In addition, the perception of regulatory or technology-related risks are important
determinants of (energy as well as non-energy) firms’ investment behaviour (Masini and
Menichetti, 2013). Finally, residential households are very likely investors for small-scale
solar PV assets. Their investment considerations are usually based on residential retail
tariffs as well as a number of non-economic aspects, such as investing in green technologies
or achieving a certain level of autonomy (Jager, 2006; Kwan, 2012; Graebig et al., 2014;
Islam, 2014; De Groote et al., 2016; Bertsch et al., 2017a)). For the latter two (investments
by non-energy companies and residential households), the IRR estimates based on whole-
sale prices should therefore be understood as lower boundaries as the wholesale prices are
only one component of the total industrial and residential retail tariffs.
Overall, the rates of return required to undertake an investment in RES technologies
vary significantly between different types of investors (Karneyeva and Wüstenhagen, 2017)
and may also vary across countries. For instance, our results (see Figure 2a) show that the
IRR of solar PV investments is below 7% for around half of the countries, which may not
be enough to incentivise utilities to invest in this technology (Bonnafous and Jensen, 2005).
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For residential households, studies show that these face a market interest rate between 1%
and 3% (LaMonaca and Ryan, 2017; De Groote and Verboven, 2016) and may consider
15 years as a reasonable payback period for their investment. At the household level, the
investment in solar PV may therefore be undertaken in most of the countries by 2030 (see
Figure 7a).
As for wind offshore, it is interesting to observe that this technology is almost never
profitable in our analysis, which concurs with findings by Green and Vasilakos (2011).
However, in recent auctions held in Germany for instance, investors submitted bids for
wind offshore projects without any financial support.7 One possible reason could be that
the investors expect strong reductions in investment costs associated with this technology
(Radov et al., 2016). However, our analysis on the impact of technology cost variations
(see Figure 6) shows that even for a reduction of wind offshore investment costs to 2,000
€/kW (i.e. a reduction to around 50% of today’s costs), the IRR does not exceed 5% in
any of the countries and does not exceed 3% in most countries. In order to understand
under which conditions wind offshore may become profitable, we carried out an additional
sensitivity analysis on the corresponding capacity factors. For this purpose, we increased
the capacity factors of wind offshore in all countries proportionally reflecting technological
improvements. With a capacity factor between 40 and 50% for all the countries with wind
offshore potential, however, we still find that capital costs above 2,500 €/kW result in IRRs
below 6% for all countries. This suggests that there may be other considerations behind
these wind offshore bids. Either, the investors expect lower technology costs in combination
with high fuel prices and/or longer lifetimes or they may evaluate the importance of
entering in this market as a strategic option and may re-evaluate their investment decisions
over time, e.g., as information about new support schemes (to be put in place by 2030)
becomes available (Brown et al., 2015). However, such ‘wait-and-see’ strategies have been
proven to be detrimental (Dedecca et al., 2016). We acknowledge that all these factors
are crucial to understand the strategy of the investors in wind offshore but they cannot
be included within the scope of this paper.
While the focus of this paper is the assessment of the economic viability of different
renewable technologies across Europe on the basis of the IRR, there are non-economic con-
siderations which are important, in particular for policy makers, in the context of RES-E
deployment. Above, we already mentioned non-economic determinants of investments
7https://www.cleanenergywire.org/news/support-free-bids-again-germanys-second-offshore-wind-auction
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such as the willingness to pay for ‘green investments’ or autonomy. Another crucial aspect
for the successful and timely deployment of renewables is the public acceptance of these
investments, i.e. not the acceptance by those investing but by those who are affected by
the investments (e.g., Bertsch et al., 2017b; Hyland and Bertsch, 2018). Acceptance of
renewable technologies usually depends on the technology type (e.g., solar vs. wind), the
size of the investment and the geographical distance between the built capacity and the
people affected (Wüstenhagen et al., 2007; Bertsch et al., 2016). For instance, studies show
that (i) the social acceptance of renewable projects is inversely related to the geographical
proximity to residential dwellings and (ii) that the acceptance of solar PV is much higher
than that of wind onshore even at very low distances to people’s homes (e.g., Bertsch
et al., 2016, 2017b; Harold et al., 2018). Moreover, existing research has found that in
some regions the public acceptance of wind offshore is higher than that of wind onshore
(Schmidt, 2017). This is important to understand for both policy makers and investors
as such considerations of public acceptance may counterbalance the economic advantages
of wind onshore to some extent. While policy makers might give preference to solar PV
or even wind offshore instead of wind onshore with the objective of ensuring a timely
achievement of the European renewable energy targets, investors might give preference to
solar PV hoping to avoid project delays. Overall, this underlines the importance of under-
standing the investment economics and public acceptance of different RES-E technologies
as well as the tradeoffs people make and their willingness to pay for the second-cheapest or
even third-cheapest RES-E technologies if their acceptance levels are higher. The analysis
presented in this paper is one contribution to resolving this conundrum.
As for all quantitative studies, the analysis and results presented in this paper come
along with some limitations and therefore need to be interpreted with caution. We use the
internal rate of return (IRR), which is the discount rate that makes the net present value
(NPV) of all the cash flows produced by a project (both negative and positive) net of the
necessary investment to implement the project equal to zero. Santos et al. (2014) highlight
that a real option analysis would be better suited than the IRR methodology, in particular
when investors face uncertainty and may postpone their investment decision.8 However,
in the framework in this paper, we consider only one year (2030) and we acknowledge
the simplifying assumption that the projects have constant annual cash flows over their
lifetime. Nevertheless, the IRR gives a sound estimate of the profitability of each project,
8See also Ceseña et al. (2013).
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and (in our specific case) is also a good measure to compare projects between different
countries. Moreover, in order to calculate the costs associated with the investment in
renewable generation, we assume that the costs of solar and wind technologies are the
same across Europe. We acknowledge that this is a simplifying hypothesis that may be
changed in future work.
5 Conclusions and policy implications
This work has estimated the marked-based profitablity of different renewable technology
investments across Europe. The analysis focuses on solar PV as well as wind power
(onshore as well as offshore), does not assume any separate financial support for renewables
and uses the internal rate of return (IRR) as an indicator to compare the profitability
between technologies and countries.
We show that investments in the considered technologies are not homogeneously prof-
itable across Europe. Our results reveal four categories of countries. The first category
includes a number of countries in Scandinavia and other parts of Northern or Western Eu-
rope where wind onshore is rather profitable, while the profitability of solar PV is low. The
second category consists of a group of countries in the South-Eastern part of Central Eu-
rope (e.g., the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria) where solar PV is rather
profitable, whereas wind onshore investments achieve very low IRRs. The third category
includes countries in Central Europe (e.g., Luxembourg, Lithuania and Slovenia) where
neither solar PV nor wind onshore are perticularly profitable. Finally, the fourth category
consists of countries in Southern Europe with coastal access (e.g., Portugal, Greece and
Cyprus) where the profitability of both solar PV and wind onshore is rather high. Wind
offshore is not found to be profitable under our baseline assumptions.
We also carried out a number of sensitivity analyses to explore the impact of varying
key factors, such as the fuel prices, technology costs and technology lifetimes. Our analysis
shows that a reduction in the lifetime of the projects, increased technology costs / less than
anticipated technology cost reductions by 2030 and lower fuel prices significantly reduce
the profitability of wind and solar investments. More specifically, we observe that the
downside risks and the upside potentials of the investments are distributed asymmetrically,
i.e. the downside risk of lower fuel prices and shorter technology lifetimes is larger than
the corresponding upside potential of higher fuel prices and longer lifetimes. In contrast,
the upside potential of decreased technology costs is larger than the downside risk of
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increased costs. All these factors need to be taken into account when assessing whether
the investments in renewables will meet the 2030 targets in the absence of any financial
supports by Member States or what form and level of support may be required in different
states to meet the targets.
There are a number of messages that policy-makers can take away from this research.
First, our analysis shows that allowing for some form of trading renewable generation
between countries or providing some other mechanism for joint target achievement / co-
operation between European countries (as opposed to national targets that have to be met
nationally only) can be expected to achieve the overall targets at lower costs. Comparing
the 2030 target shares (Figure 1) and profitabilities (Figure 2) reveals that some countries
have high RES-E targets while the profitability is rather moderate or low and vice versa.
This suggests that either financial support payments will be required (ultimately leading
to higher costs to consumers) to meet the targets in these countries or the targets may not
be met. Trading of renewable generation between countries can resolve both problems.
Should countries, for whatever reason, wish to achieve certain technology-specific national
targets, our analysis provides quantitative support in determining which technologies need
support in which countries. Moreover, our analysis shows that in most countries at least
one technology (wind onshore or solar PV) is profitable by 2030 even in absence of any
financial support payments. Second, our analyses provide insights for policy makers as
to how sensitive a successful RES deployment and target achievement are to uncertain-
ties related to different factors. For technology developers, these analyses can be used to
derive targets in relation to technology cost reductions and lifetimes. Third, our results
show that in quite a few countries, wind onshore is more profitable than solar PV, and
definitively more profitable than wind offshore. Beyond these economic considerations,
however, the public acceptance of energy infrastructure investments is a prerequisite for
a successful deployment of renewables, which has been shown to be higher for solar PV
and wind offshore compared to wind onshore in many cases as discussed in section 4. It is
therefore crucial for policy makers to have an open and transparent discourse about the
tradeoff people make between consumer costs (depending, amongst others, on the prof-
itability of investments) and acceptance related to different renewable technologies. The
analyses presented in this paper provide an important contribution to understanding the
investment economic side of this tradeoff.
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